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Highlights
• A Danish 1987 tax reform reduced the tax rate applied to interest deductions from 73% to 50%.
• We measure the e↵ect of the reform using longitudinal income-tax return data.
• We find that the tax reform reduced interest payments on debt.
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Abstract
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1 Introduction
In many OECD countries households have the opportunity to reduce their taxable
income by the amount of interest paid on their loans. Theoretically, the decision to
borrow and the amount of debt carried forward from one period to the next is influenced
by the after-tax interest rate, which usually depends on the tax payer’s marginal tax
rate (MTR)1. Despite the obvious policy relevance, the empirical evidence about the
extent to which households adjust their total interest payments when the tax subsidy
changes is limited and conclusions are mixed.2
Martins and Villanueva (2006) examine the effect of a Portuguese reform of an
interest subsidy scheme that introduced a ceiling on the size of the subsidized loan.
They find that the reform reduced the propensity to take up mortgage loans. Jappelli
and Pistaferri (2007) examine the effect of a reform that changed after-tax interest rates
by partially phasing out the interest deductibility of mortgage debt. They use a data
set composed of repeated cross sections from the Italian SHIW and find that the level
of mortgage debt is not affected by the reform.
We estimate the effect of a Danish 1987 tax reform, which reduced the tax rate
applied to interest deductions on all loans from 73% to 50% for households with high
incomes, but less for households with middle or low incomes. The reform gave high
income households a strong incentive to lower their debt burden. The incentive was
smaller in the middle tax bracket, and people in the lowest tax bracket experienced
virtually no change in the tax value of interest deductions. We use high quality panel
data tracking a random sample of Danish households from 1984 to 1990. The data
are collected from the tax authorities and contain information about households’ total
interest payments.
This paper differs in several ways from the earlier studies. First, our data allow us to
observe total interest payments, which is attractive because it is the relevant variable for
tax purposes. Second, the after-tax interest rate is a function of MTR which is in turn
a function of income, implying that estimates based on cross sectional comparisons are
likely to be biased. Moreover, individuals may adjust earned income to accommodate
the effects of the changes in the tax incentives, and this may shift some individuals
into different tax brackets. We calculate MTRs based on the income in 1984, the year
1Throughout, MTR will denote the marginal tax rate.
2Such tax provisions predominantly target mortgage loans. Maki (2001), Skinner and Feenberg
(1990) provide evidence on household debt re-allocation in response to changes in relative after-tax
price of mortgage and non-mortgage debt.
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before the reform was announced, and the MTRs that we apply in our analysis were
therefore not affected by the reform. This design can only be implemented with panel
data.
2 The 1987 Danish Tax Reform
The Danish income tax system is built around a proportional local government tax and
a progressive tax collected by the central government, which is the same for everyone.
The local government tax rates vary across municipalities. In 1986, the highest local
government tax rate was 31% and a high-income person living in that municipality
would face a MTR of 75.95%. A tax ceiling ensured, however, that the MTR could not
exceed 73%. Earned income, transfer income and capital income were taxed according
to the same schedule.
The tax reform, announced in 1985 and implemented in 1987, broke the link between
the MTR on earnings/transfer income and capital income. The reform reduced the tax
value of negative capital income, i.e. the tax value of interest deductions, to 50%
across all levels of income. The tax reform thereby decreased the tax value of interest
deductions from 73% to 50% for the top tax bracket. The tax reform also reduced the
tax rate applied to positive capital income to 56% and lowered the tax ceiling applied
to earned income to 68% in the highest bracket and 56% in the middle bracket. The
MTRs across tax brackets before and after the reform are summarized in Table 1.
For a high-income person the MTR on negative capital income fell by 23%-points
and for a person in the middle bracket it fell by some 12%-points. Individuals in the
lowest tax bracket were hardly affected. The MTR on earned income was reduced by
5%-points for persons in the top bracket and by 6%-points in the middle bracket. All
types of interest payments are deductible both before and after the reform.
3 Data
We analyze income tax return data for a 10% random sample from the Danish popula-
tion where we can track individuals and households longitudinally from 1984 to 1990.
The data contains information about total interest payments and other types of income.
Based on this we are able to calculate the MTRs. We group people at the household
level and calculate the MTR facing the male. Information about demographic variables
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Figure 1: Interest Payments by Tax Bracket
10
10
.2
10
.4
10
.6
10
.8
Lo
g 
in
te
re
st
 p
ay
m
en
ts
1984 1986 1988 1990
Year
Bottom
Top
Middle
Note: The dots indicate means within year and 1984 tax bracket group. The lines are regression lines made over pre-
and post reform years for each tax bracket
is collected and merged from different public administrative registers.
We start out with 74,194 household units. We include only stable household units
and drop individuals living in common households, i.e. more than one family sharing
residence, or individuals that live with their parents. Furthermore, we exclude house-
holds who made no interest payments (non-borrowers) during the period we examine,
since we are interested in the effect of an increase in after-tax interest rates on debt. We
include households where the male is aged between 20 and 60 in 1984. Finally, we drop
observations for which we do not have enough information to calculate MTRs leaving a
sample consisting of 45,332 household units. The data set is constructed from admin-
istrative registers, and therefore there is no attrition issue due to non-response. The
only type of attrition is due to death and migration leaving us with seven observations
for almost all household units.
Figure 1 shows the average of the log of total household interest payments across
tax brackets together with regression lines made over pre- and post reform periods
separately. Consistent with the structure of the tax incentives the slope changes the
most in the top tax bracket followed by the middle bracket. The slope changes the least
in the bottom bracket.
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4 Methodology
In order to quantify the elasticity of interest payments wrt. the MTR on negative
capital income we estimate the following regression for household i in year t:
lnRit = α0 + α1ln (1− τit) + α2 ln yit + δt + ξi + uit, (1)
where Rit is total interest payments, τit is the MTR on negative capital income, yit is the
after-tax income. δt is a year dummy, ξi is an individual specific effect that is potentially
correlated with the regressors, and uit is an error term. The parameter of interest is
α1, which is the elasticity of interest payments wrt. the marginal net-of-tax rate on
negative capital income. This specification is inspired by the literature estimating the
elasticity of taxable income, e.g. Kleven and Schultz (2014).
The tax system is nonlinear, and this means that the the MTR is endogenous to
the choice of income, i.e. ln (1− τit) and ln yit are potentially correlated with uit in
(1). Intuitively, this happens because people potentially choose the level of interest
payments to obtain a particular tax rate. For example, if a higher tax rate generates
higher deductions, and if that creates a behavioral response which increases interest
payments then the bias is likely to be positive.3 To address the potential endogeneity
we instrument ln (1− τit) with ln(1−τ 84it ), where τ 84it is the tax rate calculated based on
1984 tax return information but using year t tax rules. Similarly, ln yit is instrumented
using ln y84it where y84it is after-tax income calculated using year t tax rules and 1984
income.
5 Results
Results from estimating equation (1) are reported in Table 2. Column (1) presents fixed
effects (FE) estimates where the potential endogeneity of τit is not addressed. We find
a negative elasticity as expected. In column (2) we instrument ln (1− τit) and ln yit
following the strategy outlined above and control for individual fixed effects. This is
our preferred specification, and we find an elasticity of –7.01%.4 This means that the
tax subsidy for interest payments on debt has a causal impact on the level of interest
3However, many things can influence the direction of the bias (Saez et al., 2012) and it is generally
not possible to sign the bias.
4This is consistent with the findings of Kleven and Schultz (2014) investigating responsiveness of
negative capital income with respect to the MTR.
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Table 2: Main Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FE FEIV Owners High Ri84 Low Ri84
ln(1− τit) -0.0177∗ -0.0701∗∗∗ -0.0666∗∗∗ -0.0427∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗∗
(0.00726) (0.0103) (0.00859) (0.00652) (0.0319)
ln yit 1.088∗∗∗ 0.468∗∗ 0.0952 -0.0854 1.134
(0.0191) (0.162) (0.128) (0.129) (0.595)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Changes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 267419 263209 231511 131602 131600
Changes: year-to-year differences in the number of adults and children respectively.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
payments on debt.
The responsiveness to tax incentives might be sensitive to the type of debt and to the
size of debt. In column (3) we present estimates for home owners for whom mortgage
payments constitute the majority of interest payments. The estimated elasticity is
not far from that for the overall sample. In column (4) and (5) we split the sample
according to the size of interest payments in 1984. Specifically, we split the sample
at the median level of interest payments in 1984 (44,353 1990-DKK) and estimate the
preferred specification separately on the two sub-samples. We find an elasticity for the
low interest payment group of –16.4% and an elasticity for the high interest payment
group of –4.3%, and these are statistically different from each other. The latter result
shows that responses are heterogenous and depend on the initial level of debt.
6 Conclusion
We estimate the effect of a Danish 1987 tax reform which reduced the tax rate applied
to interest deductions from 73% to 50% for households with high incomes, but less for
households with middle or low incomes. Using high quality panel data we find that tax
subsidies for interest payments on debt impact interest payments. The estimate overall
elasticity to be –7.01%. We also find that the responsiveness varies with the initial
level of interest payments. This points towards the importance of further exploring
heterogenous responses to tax subsidies on interest payments in future studies.
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